Using subjective expectations to model the neural underpinnings of proactive inhibition by Pas, Pascal et al.
Eur J Neurosci. 2018;1–12.    |  1wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/ejn
Received: 12 July 2018 | Revised: 26 November 2018 | Accepted: 30 November 2018
DOI: 10.1111/ejn.14308
R E S E A R C H  R E P O R T
Using subjective expectations to model the neural underpinnings 
of proactive inhibition
Pascal Pas1  | Stefan Du Plessis2  | Hanna E. van den Munkhof3  | Thomas E. 
Gladwin4  | Matthijs Vink5
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original 
work is properly cited.
2018 The Authors. European Journal of Neuroscience published by Federation of European Neuroscience Societies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Edited by Chandan Vaidya. Reviewed by Alexandra Sebastian.
All peer review communications can be found with the online version of the article.
Abbreviations: IPC, Inferior parietal cortex; MRI, Magnetic resonance imaging; PMd, Dorsal pre‐motor cortex; rIFC, Right inferior frontal cortex; rIFG, 
Right inferior frontal gyrus; rIPC, Right inferior parietal cortex; SMA, Supplementary motor area; SSAT, Stop‐signal anticipation task; SSD, Stop‐signal 
delay.
1University Medical Center Utrecht, Utrecht 
University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
2Department of Psychiatry, Stellenbosch 
University, Cape Town, South Africa
3Max Planck Institute for Metabolism 
Research, Cologne, Germany
4University of Chichester, Chichester, UK
5Departments of Experimental & 
Developmental Psychology, Utrecht 
University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
Correspondence
Brain Center Rudolf Magnus, University 
Medical Center Utrecht, Utrecht University, 
Utrecht, The Netherlands.
Email: p.pas@umcutrecht.nl
Abstract
Proactive inhibition – the anticipation of having to stop a response – relies on objec-
tive information contained in cue‐related contingencies in the environment, as well 
as on the subjective interpretation derived from these cues. To date, most studies of 
brain areas underlying proactive inhibition have exclusively considered the objective 
predictive value of environmental cues, by varying the probability of stop‐signals. 
However, by only taking into account the effect of different cues on brain activation, 
the subjective component of how cues affect behavior is ignored. We used a modi-
fied stop‐signal response task that includes a measurement for subjective expecta-
tion, to investigate the effect of this subjective interpretation. After presenting a cue 
indicating the probability that a stop‐signal will occur, subjects were asked whether 
they expected a stop‐signal to occur. Furthermore, response time was used to retro-
spectively model brain activation related to stop‐expectation. We found more activa-
tion during the cue period for 50% stop‐signal probability, when contrasting with 0%, 
in the mid and inferior frontal gyrus, inferior parietal lobe and putamen. When con-
trasting expected vs. unexpected trials, we found modest effects in the mid frontal 
gyrus, parietal, and occipital areas. With our third contrast, we modeled brain activa-
tion during the cue with trial‐by‐trial variances in response times. This yielded acti-
vation in the putamen, inferior parietal lobe, and mid frontal gyrus. Our study is the 
first to use the behavioral effects of proactive inhibition to identify the underlying 
brain regions, by employing an unbiased task‐design that temporally separates cue 
and response.
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1 |  INTRODUCTION
Anticipating future events is a fundamental hallmark of 
higher‐order cognitive control, as it serves to improve per-
formance and consequently aid survival. For example, by 
delaying a response, the chance that the response can be in-
hibited successfully or alternative action can be taken is in-
creased (Logan & Cowan, 1984). This type of anticipation 
is commonly referred to as proactive inhibition (Chikazoe, 
Jimura, Hirose, et al., 2009; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009; 
Vink, Kaldewaij, Zandbelt, Pas, & du Plessis, 2015; 
Vink et al., 2014; Vink, de Leeuw, et al., 2015; Zandbelt, 
Bloemendaal, Neggers, Kahn, & Vink, 2012; Zandbelt & 
Vink, 2010).
Tasks that are designed to engage proactive inhibi-
tion typically use cues at the start of each trial to indi-
cate the likelihood of a stop‐signal. We have consistently 
shown that reaction times increase with an increasing 
stop‐signal likelihood in healthy adult subjects (Vink 
et al., 2005), but not in children (Vink et al., 2014), the 
elderly (Kleerekooper et al., 2016), and various psychiat-
ric patient groups (Vink, Ramsey, Raemaekers, & Kahn, 
2006). In the brain, proactive inhibition involves activity 
in a network associated with stopping, consisting of the 
striatum, supplementary motor area (SMA), dorsal pre-
motor cortex (PMd), right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG), 
and right inferior parietal cortex (rIPC) (Vink et al., 2005; 
Chikazoe, Konishi, Asari, Jimura, & Miyashita, 2007; 
Chikazoe, Jimura, Hirose, et al., 2009; Jahfari, Stinear, 
Claffey, Verbruggen, & Aron, 2010; Zandbelt & Vink, 
2010; Duque, Labruna, Verset, Olivier, & Ivry, 2012; 
Zandbelt, Bloemendaal, Hoogendam, Kahn, & Vink, 2013; 
van Belle, Vink, Durston, & Zandbelt, 2014).
To date, most studies investigating the neural components 
of proactive inhibitory control have relied solely on model-
ing brain activation changes related to variations in the ob-
jective stop‐signal likelihood indicated by cues (see Figure 1 
for a schematic representation). However, as we have shown 
(Vink, de Leeuw, et al., 2015; Vink, Kaldewaij, et al., 2015 
Pas, van den Munkhof, du Plessis, & Vink, 2017) subjects’ 
expectations vary greatly within a stop‐signal category. We 
used an unbiased design in which the cue was separated in 
time (1,000 to 2,000 ms) from the presentation of the stim-
ulus and subsequent response. In doing so, we are able to 
investigate preparatory proactive processes associated with 
the cue independent from the actual stimulus and response. 
Immediately after the presentation of the cue, which indi-
cated stop‐signal likelihood, subjects had to indicate whether 
or not they expected a stop‐signal in the upcoming stimulus 
(Vink, de Leeuw, et al., 2015; Vink, Kaldewaij, et al., 2015). 
With this task, we found that while the cues objectively rep-
resented an average stop‐signal likelihood, subjects varied in 
their subjective expectation whether or not a stop‐signal will 
occur and thus in the amount of proactive inhibitory control 
(Zandbelt et al., 2013). Using this approach, we were able to 
show for the first time that activation in the striatum, SMA, 
PMd, and midbrain is related to the subjective expectation of 
having to stop a response.
However, this approach is limited because [a] it forces 
subjects to translate their gut feeling into a two‐choice re-
sponse (‘yes’ or ‘no’), and [b] subjects have no way to indi-
cate the level of certainty of their response. So, rather than 
asking subjects what they expect, we propose to use trial‐to‐
trial variations in reaction times during the stimulus and re-
sponse period as indicator of stop‐signal expectation already 
during the cue period. Some support for this approach comes 
from data from our previous study, in which we found that 
on average subjects showed the slowest responses when they 
indicated they expected a stop‐signal (Vink, de Leeuw, et al., 
2015; Vink, Kaldewaij, et al., 2015). Since proactive inhibi-
tion is characterized by the slowing down of responses, we 
use this objective behavioral marker to investigate its neural 
underpinnings.
F I G U R E  1  Schematic representation of the processes that lead up to proactive inhibition. In terms of a stop‐signal task, a cue represents the 
probability of a stop occurring. However, subjects may interpret identical cues differently, and can therefore vary in their subjective expectation on 
a trial‐by‐trial basis. This expectation of a stop occurring or not will subsequently lead to the slowing of responses. Our current research uses this 
response slowing to disentangle the processes leading up to response inhibition, and model brain activation specifically related to the expectation of 
having to stop
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In our current paper, we model the amount of proactive in-
hibition based on the trial‐to‐trial variations in response speed 
for trials with a 50% stop‐signal probability. To date, several 
studies used reaction times to investigate inhibitory control. 
For example, Hu and Li (Hu & Li, 2011) showed signifi-
cant contributions of the bilateral putamen, inferior parietal 
lobe, and right prefrontal cortex to preparatory inhibition by 
using a complex statistical model that, among other factors, 
included a contrast between fast and slow trials. Moreover, 
Li and colleagues have employed several intricate Bayesian 
models to show that prolonged response times are associated 
with activation in the pre‐SMA and insula (Hu, Ide, Zhang, 
& Li, 2015), and that the longer intervals between cue and re-
sponse may disrupt proactive inhibitory control (Wang et al., 
2018).
We now take a much simpler approach of investigating 
proactive inhibition by parametrically modeling brain acti-
vation during the cue period based on response speed during 
the actual stimulus and response period. This allows us to use 
trial‐to‐trial variations in response speed as indicator of the 
amount of proactive inhibitory control that is being engaged 
independent from the general stop‐signal probability context 
as indicated by the cue. Importantly, we employed a design in 
which brain activation during the cue period can be modeled 
independently from activation during the stimulus and re-
sponse period (Zandbelt et al., 2013; Vink, de Leeuw, et al., 
2015; Vink, Kaldewaij, et al., 2015; Pas et al., 2017). In this 
task, the cue period and stimulus‐response period are ade-
quately separated in time (a delay varying between 1,000 and 
2,000 ms), so that interpretation of brain activation during 
the cue period is not biased by response speed (e.g. longer 
responses allowing for greater buildup of blood oxygenation 
level dependency‐signal).
Here, we use functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI) and an unbiased design to investigate the neural under-
pinnings of proactive inhibition by means of parametrically 
modeling response speed. Twenty‐five healthy volunteers 
performed a modified delayed‐response stop‐signal anticipa-
tion task (SSAT) while being scanned with functional MRI. 
During the cue period, a cue indicates the stop‐signal prob-
ability (0% or 50%), and subjects are asked whether or not 
they expect a stop‐signal to occur (yes/no/don('t know). After 
a variable delay (ranging from 1,000 to 2,000 ms), the stim-
ulus is presented, requiring subjects to respond (go trials) or 
refrain from responding (stop trials). Finally, brain activation 
during the cue is parametrically modeled based on response 
times during the stimulus and response period. Proactive 
inhibition networks are investigated using three contrasts: 
the effect of stop‐signal probability (0% vs. 50%), the effect 
of subjective expectation (expected vs. not‐expected trials 
during the 50% trials), and the parametric effect of response 
speed during the 50% trials. In this way, we were able to in-
vestigate proactive inhibition by means of the effect of cues, 
subjects’ expressed subjective experience, and what people 
actually do. Importantly, we focused on the cue period that 
occurs 1,000 to 2,000 ms prior to the onset of the stimulus. 
By doing so, we center our analyses on preparatory processes. 
Given our design, these processes are not contaminated by 
processes underlying actual responding and feedback pro-
cesses triggered by the response (Zandbelt et al., 2013). We 
hypothesized that by modeling activation during the cue pe-
riod with subjects’ subsequent responses will more accurately 
highlight the brain regions associated with proactive inhibi-
tion. We will be able to remove unexplained noise that is left 
in our data when contrasting brain activation for the two cues, 
or taking into account expressed subjective experience and 
contrasting expected versus unexpected stop‐signals.
2 |  MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1 | Subjects
Twenty‐five volunteers (age M = 21.6 years, SD = 2.7; 5 
females, 20 males) participated in the experiment. All sub-
jects were right‐handed, reported no history of psychiatric or 
neurologic disorders and gave written informed consent. The 
study was approved by the ethics committee of the University 
Medical Center Utrecht. This study conformed to the 2013 
WMA Declaration of Helsinki. The dataset was previously 
used to investigate brain activation during reactive inhibition 
(Pas et al., 2017), our current analyses deal with the neural 
underpinnings of proactive inhibition and are limited to the 
cue phase of the experiment.
2.2 | Stop‐signal anticipation task
Subjects performed the SSAT (Zandbelt et al., 2013), a 
stop‐signal task designed to measure proactive and reac-
tive inhibitory control. The task and experimental proce-
dures were adapted from (Vink, de Leeuw, et al., 2015; 
Vink, Kaldewaij, et al., 2015), see Figure 2 for an over-
view. In short, subjects were instructed to stop a moving 
bar on the screen (referred to as “go” trials). In some trials, 
the bar stops moving on its own (referred to as the stop‐
signal) and subjects have to refrain from responding. At 
the beginning of each trial, a cue indicates the probability 
that the bar will stop: either a ‘0’ indicating no chance of 
a stop‐signal occurring, or a ‘*’ indicating the possibility 
that a stop‐signal could occur. Subjects were asked imme-
diately following the cue to answer the question: ‘Do you 
expect a stop‐signal?’ by pressing a button corresponding 
to ‘yes’ or ‘no’. This provided us with information con-
cerning the subjects’ subjective stop‐signal expectation. 
If subjects did not respond within 1,000 ms, the trial was 
coded as ‘don't know’. Also, if subjects had no expecta-
tion at all, they were instructed to refrain from making a 
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choice and the trial would continue in the same fashion. 
Task difficulty was managed in a step‐wise fashion, with a 
varying delay between the stop cue and the target depend-
ing on correct or incorrect trials. This ensured overall stop 
accuracy to be around 50% for each individual subject. In 
total, 180 trials were presented, 60 trials with 0% stop‐
signal probability and 120 trials with a 50% stop‐signal 
probability. These trials were ordered in a pseudo‐random 
sequence that was fixed across subjects.
2.3 | Data acquisition
Imaging was performed on a 3.0 T Achieva whole‐
body MRI scanner (Philips Medical Systems, Best, the 
Netherlands) at the University Medical Center Utrecht. 
Functional (T2*‐weighted) echo planar images with blood 
oxygen level‐dependent contrast oriented in a transverse 
plane tilted 20° over the left–right axis were obtained in a 
single run (683 volumes; 30 slices per volume; voxel size, 
4 mm isotropic; repetition time, 1,600 ms; echo time, 
23 ms). A whole brain T1‐weighted structural image 
(185 slices; repetition time, 8.4 ms; echo time, 3.8 ms; 
flip angle, 8°; field of view, 252 × 185 × 288 mm; voxel 
size, 1 mm isotropic) was acquired for within‐subject 
registration purposes.
2.4 | Analyses
The percentage of trials was calculated where subjects ex-
pected a stop to occur. This was done separately for trials 
with a 0% stop‐signal probability and for trials with a 50% 
stop‐signal probability. In addition, the effect of stop‐signal 
expectation on accuracy and response times was assessed. 
The impact of stop‐signal expectation on the speed of inhi-
bition was measured by the stop‐signal reaction time, com-
puted according to the integration method (Logan & Cowan, 
1984). The stop trial accuracy was also determined for both 
stop‐signal expectation conditions.
2.5 | Imaging
Image data were processed using SPM8 (http://www.
fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). Preprocessing involved realign-
ment, slice timing correction, spatial normalization to 
the Montreal Neurological Institute template brain, and 
smoothing (8 mm full width at half maximum) to correct 
for inter‐individual differences. Functional images were 
submitted to a general linear model regression analysis. 
Activation time‐locked to the presentation of the cue and 
to the stimulus response period was modeled based on 
stop‐signal probability and stop‐signal expectation. Trials 
in which a subject did not indicate an expectation, trials 
F I G U R E  2  Delayed‐response stop‐signal anticipation task. On each trial, a bar moved at constant speed from the bottom line to the upper 
line, reaching the middle white line in 800 ms (c). The aim is to stop the moving bar as close to the middle white line as possible by pressing a 
button with the right thumb. These trials are referred to as go trials. In some trials, the bar stops moving automatically before reaching the middle 
white line (stop), indicating that subjects have to refrain from reacting. The stop‐signal delay (SSD) was initially set at 550 ms and was varied in 
steps of 33 ms according to a tracking procedure (SSD is increased after a successful stop trial; SSD is decreased after stop‐trials in which subjects 
fail to inhibit). At the beginning of each trial, the stop‐signal probability was indicated by a cue (the exact stop‐signal probability was not visible for 
the subjects) (a). Immediately after this cue, subjects indicated whether they expected a stop‐signal in the upcoming trial by pressing a button (yes/
no) (b). They were not forced to make a decision; the task continued after 1,000 ms regardless of a response. ISI, inter‐stimulus interval. The inter‐
trial interval (not pictured) varied from 1,000 to 2,000 s
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with zero stop‐signal probability where subjects nonethe-
less expected a stop and incorrect go trials were considered 
as errors and added to the nuisance factor. Cue‐related ac-
tivation was modeled as epochs of 1,500 ms. On average 
the inter‐trial interval was 1,000 ms (ranging from 500 to 
1,500 ms), and served as an implicit baseline. Six realign-
ment parameters were added as regressors of no interest 
to correct for head motion. All data were high‐pass fil-
tered with a cut‐off of 128 s to control for low‐frequency 
drifts.
To investigate the brain regions associated with pro-
active inhibition, we performed three whole brain analy-
ses during the cue period. First, to investigate the effect 
of stop‐signal probability, we contrasted activation in the 
brain during go trials for cues indicating the possibility 
of a stop‐signal, and those without. Second, we tested the 
effect of expectation in go‐trials for the cues with a stop‐
signal probability of 50%, by contrasting those cues where 
subjects expressed expecting a stop to occur, with those in 
which they did not. Last, we looked at brain activity for the 
go‐trials in which a stop‐signal could occur (i.e., within 
the set of 50% cue trials), with subjects’ subsequent re-
sponse times included as a parametric modulator in a sep-
arate model. For this, the hemodynamic response function 
is convolved with a signal containing delta peaks multi-
plied by the response times, as we expect more brain acti-
vation during the cue period when subjects slowed down 
afterwards. All brain activation maps will be thresholded 
at a family wise error‐corrected cluster level of p < 0.05, 
with cluster sizes determined using CorrClusTh (http://
www.sph.umich.edu/∼nichols/JG5/CorrClusTh.m).
3 |  RESULTS
3.1 | Behavior
An overview of the percentage of trials in which a stop‐
signal was expected is presented in Table 1. Subjects 
expressed their expectations in accordance with the cue 
probability, with expected and unexpected trials differing 
significantly between the conditions. The amount of trials 
 
0% stop‐signal 
probability
>50% stop‐signal 
probability
Paired 
samples t‐test
Stop‐signal expected 2 ± 5 48 ± 14 t(24) = −14.3, 
p < 0.001
Stop‐signal not 
expected
95 ± 5 45 ± 12 t(24) = 16.9, 
p < 0.001
No expectation 
indicated
3 ± 2 7 ± 14 t(24) = −1.8, 
p = 0.09
T A B L E  1  Stop‐signal anticipation per 
trial type as mean (±SD) percentage of trials
Trial type
0% stop‐signal 
probability
50% stop‐signal probability
p‐valueNot expected Expected Test value
Go
Accuracy (%) 95 ± 5 98 ± 3 97 ± 4 F2,23 = 3.6 0.044
RT (ms) 807 ± 17 845 ± 26 857 ± 24 F2,23 = 57.6 <0.001
Stop
Accuracy (%)  46 ± 9 59 ± 7 t(24) = 4.2 <0.001
SSRT (ms)  231 ± 18 226 ± 22 t(24) = 1.1 0.28
T A B L E  2  Mean (±SD) accuracy and 
response times per trial type
F I G U R E  3  Response times for all conditions. Subjects were 
slower on trials with a stop‐signal probability of 50%, and even slower 
when they also expected one to occur. *p < 0.001
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in which subjects did not express an expectation was not 
significantly different. Accuracy and response times are 
presented in Table 2. Accuracy on go trials was close to 
100% for all conditions. As task‐difficulty was managed 
in a step‐wise fashion, overall accuracy on stop trials was 
as expected, with 52% (SD = 3). Subjects performed sig-
nificantly better on trials with expected stops (M = 59%, 
SD = 7) than trials with unexpected stops (M = 46, 
SD = 9, t(25) = 4.2, p < 0.001). Bonferroni's correction 
for multiple comparisons was used to adjust the signifi-
cance level.
In line with previous findings (Zandbelt et al., 2013; Vink, 
de Leeuw, et al., 2015; Vink, Kaldewaij, et al., 2015) subjects 
responded more slowly on trials where a stop‐signal could occur 
t(24) = 10.1, p < 0.001. When we only included trials where 
subjects did not expect a stop, subjects were again slower on 
trials where a stop could occur t(24) = 9.6, p < 0.001. Finally, 
when subjects expected a stop, their responses slowed down 
even more t(24) = 3.7, p = 0.001. This effect of response slow-
ing is visible in Figure 3.
3.2 | Imaging
See our supplemental materials for a replication of our previ-
ous study (Vink, de Leeuw, et al., 2015; Vink, Kaldewaij, 
et al., 2015), using pre‐defined regions of interest.
When contrasting the cues indicating a stop‐signal proba-
bility of 50% with those indicating 0% stop‐signal probability, 
we found activation in mid and inferior frontal gyrus, inferior 
parietal lobe and putamen (Figure 4a), indicating that these 
areas are involved with the possible inhibition of a future re-
sponse or the processing of environmental cues. Our second 
analyses contrasted the cues with a stop‐signal probability 
where subjects expected a stop, with those in which they did 
F I G U R E  4  Imaging results for 
the three whole‐brain analyses. All brain 
activation maps are thresholded at a 
family wise error‐corrected cluster level 
of p < 0.05 (height threshold of T = 3.4). 
For details see Table 3. (a) Brain activation 
for the contrast of trials with a stop‐signal 
probability of 50% vs. 0%. (b) Brain 
activation for the contrast of the cues with 
a stop‐signal probability of 50% where 
subjects expected one to occur vs. where 
they did not. (c) Brain activation during 
the cue period modulated by subsequent 
response times
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not expect one. This analysis yielded again significant activa-
tion in the mid frontal gyrus, parietal lobe and in the occipital 
gyrus (Figure 4b). Finally, we modeled activation during the 
cue period using subsequent response time as a parametric 
modulator. We found that activation in the mid frontal gyrus, 
inferior parietal lobe and right putamen positively correlated 
with response time (Figure 4c). Analogous to our model de-
picted in Figure 1, the results from Figure 4a only take into 
account the input of the stop‐signal probability cues, Figure 4b 
uses a contrast based on subjects’ expressed subjective expe-
rience, and the results from Figure 4c are based on the behav-
ioral output – i.e. response slowing. See table 3 for an overview 
of activation clusters.
4 |  DISCUSSION
Here, we used functional MRI and an unbiased design to 
investigate the neural underpinnings of proactive inhibi-
tion by means of parametrically modeling response speed 
to the cue period of a stop‐signal response task. In this 
task, cues were presented 1,000–2,000 prior to the onset of 
the stimulus and response period. Cues indicated stop‐sig-
nal probability (0%, 50%) and subjects indicated whether 
or not they expected a stop‐signal. Actual response speed 
during the stimulus and response period was taken as an 
indicator of subjective expectation of a stop‐signal.
We found significantly more activation during the cue 
period for 50% stop‐signal probability, when contrasting 
with 0%, in the right putamen, inferior and mid frontal 
gyrus and inferior parietal lobe. When contrasting expected 
vs. unexpected trials, we found modest effects in the mid 
frontal gyrus, parietal lobe, and in the occipital gyrus. With 
our third contrast, we modeled brain activation during the 
cue with trial‐by‐trial variances in response times. This 
yielded significant results in the putamen, inferior parietal 
lobe, and mid frontal gyrus. By using response slowing as 
an indication of the expectation of having to stop, that is 
only partially modulated by the cues, we were able to obtain 
a more precise estimate of the role brain regions have in sub 
serving proactive inhibition.
Activation of the putamen during cues with 50% stop 
probability and when responses were slower is in line 
with our previous research showing that activation in the 
striatum, of which the putamen forms part, depended on 
subjective anticipation of stop‐signals, in the cue phase 
(Vink, de Leeuw, et al., 2015; Vink, Kaldewaij, et al., 
2015) and during reactive inhibition (Pas et al., 2017). 
Similarly, Hu and Li (2011) found bilateral activation 
in the putamen when looking at anticipatory motor 
Region BA Side No of voxels X Y Z Max t‐value
(A) 50% > 0% probability cues
Mid. Frontal 
gyrus
6/8 L/R 2,390 −4 24 44 9
Inf. Frontal 
gyrus, 
putamen
47 R 132 28 24 −4 6.49
Precuneus 7 L/R 163 −4 −64 48 5.29
Inf. Parietal 
lobe
40 R 101 48 −48 40 5.15
(B) Expected > unexpected
Occipital 
gyrus
19 R 46 32 −84 16 5.34
Mid. frontal 
gyrus
6 L/R 51 0 −4 48 5.13
Inf. Parietal 
lobe
40 L 36 −56 −24 32 4.48
(C) Modulation of response times
Putamen, Inf. 
frontal gyrus
47 R 33 24 12 −4 5.27
Inf. Parietal 
lobe
40 R 132 52 −44 56 5.27
Mid. Frontal 
gyrus
10 R 95 40 48 24 4.81
Note. All results are significant at a family‐wise error corrected cluster level of p < 0.05; L, left; R, right; X Y Z 
refer to the center of mass.
T A B L E  3  Overview of activations
8 |   PAS et Al.
preparation. However, this research looked at a more gen-
eral type of motor preparation that was not specifically 
modeled to take into account trial‐by‐trial variations in 
response times.
Striatal activation during reactive inhibition may be part 
of the same process involved in striatal activation during stop‐
signal anticipation. In the case of successful inhibition, a stop‐
signal might have been anticipated already at the onset of the 
trial. In order to successfully inhibit a response, one simply 
needs to refrain from responding, without the need for active 
inhibition, if no response was prepared or initiated in the first 
place. Indeed, response inhibition studies have commonly re-
ported striatal activity in anticipation of a highly predictable 
stop‐signal (Aron & Poldrack, 2006; Vink et al., 2005, 2006; 
Vink, de Leeuw, et al., 2015; Vink, Kaldewaij, et al., 2015; 
Zandbelt, van Buuren, Kahn, & Vink, 2011; Zandbelt & Vink, 
2010).
Our results are supported by studies implicating the 
striatum in the control over actions (Kimura, 1992; Chen, 
Scangos, & Stuphorn, 2010; Watanabe & Munoz, 2010; 
Duque et al., 2012; Zandbelt et al., 2013). Functionally, the 
putamen is closely connected with the motor cortex (Duann, 
Ide, Luo, & Li, 2009; Forstmann et al., 2008; Vergani et al., 
2014; Vink et al., 2005; Zandbelt & Vink, 2010), and con-
sequently involved in basic motor inhibition and response 
switching (Forstmann et al., 2008). In terms of its role in 
proactive inhibition, Hu and Li (2011) found activation in 
the putamen to be specifically linked to preparatory motor 
execution. The broader area of the basal ganglia have been 
hypothesized to act as a gatekeeper, preventing execution of 
conflicting motor responses (Friend & Kravitz, 2014; Mink, 
1996). A more overarching role of the striatum is likely the 
selection of responses, and the inhibition of unselected re-
sponses, based on prior reinforcement (Vink, Pas, Bijleveld, 
Custers, & Gladwin, 2013).
Our current results show that this area, specifically the 
putamen, is involved in the process of proactive inhibition, 
and linked to the anticipation of stop‐signals. Indeed, striatal 
activity has been linked to the expectation of higher effort 
demands (Pas, Custers, Bijleveld, & Vink, 2014). Activation 
has also been demonstrated to increase during cue‐learn-
ing paradigms, with the region being linked to the forma-
tion of stimulus‐response associations (Diederen, Spencer, 
Vestergaard, Fletcher, & Schultz, 2016; Vink et al., 2013). 
During our task, subjects constantly have to ascribe a sub-
jective weight to the cue they are given – what do they actu-
ally believe is going to happen. This can therefore be seen as 
comparable to the learning phase of a cue‐learning paradigm. 
Tricomi, Delgado, McCandliss, McClelland, and Fiez (2006) 
showed that striatal activation was linked to the incorporation 
of feedback in a learning task, and data by Seger (2005) reaf-
firm its role in identifying the behavioral context for selection 
of an appropriate strategy. Striatal contributions to proactive 
inhibition could therefore lie in selecting the optimum re-
sponse and linking cues with the appropriate behavior.
When contrasting 50% over 0% stop probability, we 
found elevated activity in the inferior and mid frontal gyrus 
(IFG). In addition to the striatum, the right inferior frontal 
gyrus (IFG) has long been recognized as playing an import-
ant role in proactive inhibition (Aron, Fletcher, Bullmore, 
Sahakian, & Robbins, 2003; Rubia, Smith, Brammer, 
& Taylor, 2003; Vink, de Leeuw, et al., 2015; Vink, 
Kaldewaij, et al., 2015). An increase in functional con-
nectivity between this area and the basal ganglia has been 
shown to increase response inhibition efficiency (Xu et al., 
2016) and rIFG activity has been correlated with stopping 
speed (Whelan et al., 2012). In contrast, hypoactivation of 
the rIFG in patients with ADHD has been linked to im-
paired response inhibition (Morein‐Zamir et al., 2014). 
However, there remains controversy as to whether the rIFG 
is involved in stopping directly or in attentional engagement 
necessary for response inhibition, due to opposing findings 
and paradigmatical problems. A prominent line of reason-
ing is that this region is critical in the act of general stop-
ping (Aron, 2011), functioning as a breaking mechanism 
that can either lead to outright stopping, or to a pausing 
or slowing down of responses (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 
2014; Cai, Ryali, Chen, Li, & Menon, 2014). Aron et al. 
(2014) argue that rIFG activation represents a brake which 
is a form of partial stopping and does not necessarily lead 
to actual stopping. In this sense, cue‐related rIFG activation 
during an unsuccessful stop trial can still represent the trig-
gering of a stopping response, instead of representing atten-
tion only. In line with this, the rIFG is also activated by an 
internal motivation to stop in the absence of external cues 
(Brass & Haggard, 2007). Yet Hampshire and colleagues 
(Hampshire, 2015; Sharp et al., 2010) propose the alterna-
tive view that rIFG recruitment is related to detection of 
important cues, instead of to the subsequent suppression of 
motor responses. Indeed, cognitive control was primarily 
engaged for contextual cue monitoring instead of the actual 
stopping, during a response inhibition task (Chatham et al., 
2012) and the rIFC directs attentional processes (Baldauf & 
Desimone, 2014). Findings from the psychiatric field sup-
port this theory as well. For example, in patients suffering 
from post‐traumatic stress disorder, rIFG functioning has 
been directly linked to the processing of contextual cues 
(van Rooij et al., 2014), while in schizophrenia patients 
reduced activation in the rIFG and temporoparietal junc-
tion was accompanied by impairments in the processing 
of cues aiding proactive inhibition (Zandbelt et al., 2011). 
Therefore, involvement of the rIFG in cue processing might 
be mediated by increased attention to these cues. Inherent to 
most tasks, it is impossible to completely distinguish atten-
tive and inhibitory processes. Though Boehler, Appelbaum, 
Krebs, Chen, and Woldorff (2011) showed that the rIFG 
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only responded to relevant stop cues and not to irrelevant 
stop cues appearing in a control block in which the sub-
ject was instructed to ignore the cues, pointing to a role 
in inhibition and not to infrequent cue detection, it might 
still be related to attentional engagement. It might also be 
that differential roles in attention and inhibition are regu-
lated by distinct subareas within the rIFG or by differen-
tial network involvement (Chikazoe, Jimura, Asari, et al., 
2009; Sebastian et al., 2016; Verbruggen, Aron, Stevens, & 
Chambers, 2010). Distinct functional roles in response in-
hibition have already been assigned to different IFG subre-
gions (Cai & Leung, 2011; Chikazoe, Jimura, Asari, et al., 
2009). Alternatively, the rIFG might be generally involved 
in response control instead of in inhibition per se. Indeed, 
in a Go‐NoGo task, Dodds, Morein‐Zamir, and Robbins 
(2011) reported strong rIFG activation during a third cue 
type that instructed subjects to press an additional button. 
Although its exact role remains unclear, taken together with 
our results, this places the rIFG in a multiple demand net-
work (Kolodny, Mevorach, & Shalev, 2017).
Activity in the mid frontal gyrus correlated with increas-
ing response time, as an objective measure for stop‐signal 
expectation. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), a 
prominent structure within the mid frontal gyrus, has been 
associated with response inhibition before (Hege, Preissl, 
& Stingl, 2014; Hung, Gaillard, Yarmak, & Arsalidou, 
2018; Luijten et al., 2014) and is thought to be involved 
in executive function, cognitive flexibility, and planning. 
Specifically, this area was more active during conditional 
stopping ‐when subjects only had to stop their responses in 
a specific context‐ than during simple stopping (Chikazoe, 
Jimura, Hirose, et al., 2009; Swann et al., 2009) and is also 
though to implement task rules (Aron et al., 2014). Possibly 
in our task, when slowing down more in expectation of a 
stop‐signal, subjects are planning a change in response, 
which requires more cognitive control and flexibility than 
during unexpected stop trials, which is reflected in enhanced 
activity in the mid frontal gyrus. In all three contrasts we 
found increased activation in the inferior parietal cortex 
(IPC). Activity in the right IPC has been linked to self‐initi-
ated as opposed to triggered or automatic responses (Kühn, 
Haggard, & Brass, 2009). Kühn and colleagues suggest that 
this region plays a role in inhibitory processes when vol-
untary suppression of a response requires more selection 
effort or attention. Other research has linked the right infe-
rior parietal cortex (rIPC) to the storage of acquired motor 
skills (Niessen, Fink, & Weiss, 2014), as lesions to this re-
gion disrupt the ability to perform previously learned ac-
tions (Halsband, Schmitt, Weyers, & Binkofski, 2001), and 
has demonstrated its involvement in response selection pro-
cesses (Dippel & Beste, 2015). Together with our findings, 
this suggests that the rIPC could be involved in the decision 
for an alternative motor response when the probability or 
expectation of having to change the response, e.g., on en-
countering a stop‐signal, is high.
5 |  LIMITATIONS
Our task repeatedly asks subjects whether they expect a 
stop‐signal or not, based on a single cue. It may very well 
be that subjects’ reported expectation is not fully correlated 
with their internal subjective expectation. However, it is not 
necessarily relevant whether our self‐report measurement 
was actually able to capture our subjects’ expectations, nor 
whether choosing ‘yes’ or ‘no’ steered their behavior accord-
ingly. The objective of our task was to capture subjects’ sub-
jective expectation of having to inhibit a response and linking 
that expectation to neural activity. Nevertheless, the self‐re-
port appears to have face validity and our results show an 
effect of this reported expectation on both behavioral meas-
urement and in brain activation. By using response time as a 
parametric modulator of brain activation during the preced-
ing cue period, we have also included an objective index of 
proactive inhibition.
Our results are based on the assumption that the slowing 
down of responses can, at least partially, be explained by the 
expectation people form based on the cues. However, a mul-
titude of factors come into play on each trial that can affect 
response times, ranging from the effectiveness and speed 
of sensory processing, quality of information processing or 
a potential a priori bias for a specific response. Sequential‐
sampling models like the diffusion model describe deci-
sion‐making as a process of noisy accumulation of evidence 
from a stimulus (Ratcliff, Smith, Brown, & McKoon, 2016). 
Reaction time variability can therefore not be claimed to ex-
clusively depend on the subjective expectation of a stop sig-
nal, and there is still noise left unexplained.
6 |  CONCLUSION
Proactive inhibition is the slowing down of behavioral re-
sponses just before a possible full stop. We have shown that 
this concept cannot be fully investigated by looking only at 
the processing of objective cue information, but that it is 
necessary to take into account the variability in the effect 
that cues have on behavior. Paradigms solely relying on 
objective information derived from cues to investigate pro-
active inhibition are missing an important factor when in-
terpreting the results, namely how those cues are processed 
and interpreted by the individual at that point in time. With 
our current experiment, we have used this behavioral com-
ponent to demonstrate that activation in the putamen, mid 
frontal cortex, and inferior parietal cortex were related 
to the expectation of having to inhibit a response, i.e., 
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proactive inhibition. These results allow us to build towards 
a more complete model of response inhibition, delineating 
the roles of objective and subjective information.
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